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Abstract As the Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) technology supporting the point-
to-point application matures, the need to build the Quantum Secure Communication
Network (QSCN) to guarantee the security of a large scale of nodes becomes ur-
gent. Considering the project time and expense control, it is the first choice to build
the QSCN based on an existing classical network. Suitable modeling and simulation
are very important to construct a QSCN successfully and efficiently. In this paper, a
practical QSCN model, which can reflect the network state well, is proposed. The
model considers the volatile traffic demand of the classical network and the real
key generation capability of the QKD devices, which can enhance the accuracy of
simulation to a great extent. In addition, two unique QSCN performance indicators,
ITS (information-theoretic secure) communication capability and ITS communica-
tion efficiency, are proposed in the model, which are necessary supplements for the
evaluation of a QSCN except for those traditional performance indicators of classical
networks. Finally, the accuracy of the proposed QSCN model and the necessity of the
proposed performance indicators are verified by plentiful simulations results.
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1 Introduction
Based on the quantum key distribution (QKD) technology with the intrinsic charac-
teristics of point-to-point (P2P) [1], building a quantum secure communication net-
work (QSCN) [2–4] with multiple QKD devices is a prevailing solution to overcome
the limits of node scale and the communication distance [5–10]. Since the state-of-
the-art QKD technology has been able to support many applications at distances of
several hundred kilometers in the P2P mode, those achievements have made it pos-
sible to establish a QSCN upon an existing complex classical network. For instance,
the key distribution rate of one QKD device could reach 10 Mbps [11] and 1Mbps
[12] at the distribution distance of 10 km and 100 km, respectively. Additionally, the
key distribution distance of one QKD device could reach 404 km in optical fiber [13]
and even reach 1200 km in free space [14]. As to the existing QSCNs, the node scale
has expanded from 6 nodes [9, 15] to 56 nodes [16], and the communication distance
has extended from 19.6 kilometers [15] to 2000 kilometers [16]. With the growing
scale and complexity of QSCNs, the aforehand modeling and simulation become cru-
cial for the functional verification, the deployment optimization of QKD devices, the
project time and cost control, the network quality assurance, etc. [17–19].
Unlike the field of classical networks, the modeling and simulation in the field
of QSCN have not drawn many attentions [20–25]. In order to reduce the cost of
communication resources, some efforts in quantum network coding [20–22] have
been made. However, the analysis of network performance was neglected in these
researches. A simple trust relaying based [26, 27] QSCN simulation model was built
by Yang et al. in 2017 [24] to calculate the key consumption cost. In this work, the
key generation capability was set to be endless when the key consumption of a pair of
partners was evaluated, which is not realistic in a practical QSCN. Taking the limited
key generation capability of QKD device into account, a relatively complete QSCN
model [25] was proposed and implemented by Mehic et al. based on the Network
Simulator-version 3 (NS-3) [28] in 2017. In the [25], the key generation and traffic
generation have been simulated to estimate network performance. However, the as-
sumptions about the key generation capability and traffic demand are unreasonable.
In addition, the network performance was only measured by routing cost and packet
delivery ratio (PDR), which cannot indicate the characteristics of QSCN.
In a practical QSCN, the most important performance depends on whether the
QKD key generation capability can meet the traffic demand [29]. However, the mod-
eling of traffic demand, key generation capability and their relationship have not been
studied thoroughly in previous studies on QSCN. The main defects in the existing
studies include the following. Firstly, the end-to-end (E2E) traffic demand is mod-
eled by a constant which cannot describe the volatility of the network. Secondly,
the P2P key generation capability is modeled by the performance of the QKD post-
processing system without taking into account the effects of QKD optical system per-
formance. Thirdly, there are still lack of suitable performance indicators to measure
the relationship between the E2E traffic demand and P2P key generation capability.
Fourthly, only one pair of terminal partners communicate in the simulation, which
fails to reflect the whole status of a practical multi-party network.
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In this paper, a practical QSCN model is proposed, in which the volatility of the
E2E traffic demand is modeled by the Poisson stochastic process, and the P2P key
generation capability is modeled by the GLLP theory. In addition, two performance
indicators: ITS communication capability and ITS communication efficiency are pro-
posed to evaluate the special all-round performance of a QSCN. Finally, a QSCN
simulation in the view of the whole network is designed to verify the accuracy of the
proposed QSCN model and the necessity of the proposed performance indicators.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Sec. 2 gives the definition and basic
characteristics of QSCN. Sec. 3 describes the practical QSCN model by proposes
traffic generation module, key generation module and two performance indicators.
Sec. 4 designs a simulation to analyze the network performance in detail based on
the QSCN model. Sec. 5 concludes this study and outlines the future works.
2 Definition of quantum secure communication network
In many studies, both terms of QSCN and QKD network are used to indicate the
communication network based on QKD device. For the sake of better argument, QKD
network is defined as a set of infrastructures for generating ITS key based on the
laws of quantum mechanics [30] in this paper. The QSCN is defined as a network
that provides the secure communication service utilizing the keys generated by QKD
network. In order to achieve the ITS secure communication, the one-time-pad (OTP)
encryption algorithm is adopted in the performance analysis in this paper. If ITS is
not pursued in an application, the popular encryption algorithms, such as AES, DES
and etc., are also acceptable. The QSCN consists of two parts: QKD network and
classical network [31], shown as Fig. 1.
Fig. 1 Hierarchical diagram of QSCN
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Similar to the traditional classical network, QSCN mainly consists of terminals,
switches, links, and protocols [32]. The functions of each component are introduced
as follows.
- The terminal is the interface between a user and a communication network, which
is mainly used to transmit and receive data. In the QSCN, the terminal is ab-
stracted as a node, which can be a source node for data transmission or a destina-
tion node for data reception.
- The switch is the network device with the function of finding the next receiver and
forwarding the data. In the QSCN, the switch needs to be completely trustable and
can be abstracted as a trusted relay, which is used to forward data.
- The link refers to the medium of data communication between terminals. In fact,
it includes not only a physical channel but also various communication devices,
such as modulators and controllers. In the QSCN, it is abstracted as a P2P channel.
- The protocol defines the series of rules that enable the network to work properly.
In the QSCN, it mainly includes packet protocol and routing protocol.
3 Quantum secure communication network model
The biggest difference between the QSCN and classical network is that the classical
communication of QSCN consumes the keys generated by QKD layer. This leads to
the performance of the QSCN is closely limited by the matching degree between the
traffic demand and key generation capability. In fact, the traffic demand in the QSCN
is from E2E partners, while the key generation capability is decided by P2P links.
In order to describe the network performance more accurately, this paper proposes a
practical QSCN model, shown as Fig. 2.
In the QSCN model, the function of Traffic generation module is to model the
E2E traffic demand of classical network, and the function of Key generation mod-
ule is to model the P2P key generation capability of the QKD network. In addition,
the relationship between these two functions will be measured by two proposed per-
formance indicators. The schemes of other modules, such as routing protocols, data
encryption/decryption, etc., can be borrowed from the traditional classical network
model.
3.1 Traffic generation module
Due to the neglect of the relationship between key generation and key consumption,
the traffic demand of the classical communication [33–37] has not attracted enough
attentions in the field of QSCN. A reasonable traffic demand model of the classical
network is designed in this section.
The packet transmission process can be assumed to satisfy the following three
conditions [33]:
(1) In the non-overlapping time period, the numbers of transmitted packets are inde-
pendent variables.
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Fig. 2 QSCN model
(2) In an arbitrarily short time ∆ t, the probability of transmitting a packet is indepen-
dent of the starting time and only proportional to the length of the time period.
(3) In an arbitrarily short time ∆ t, the number of transmitted packets is either 1 or 0.
It can be proved that the packet transmission process follows a Poisson stochastic
process [38]. Let λ be the average number of transmitted packets per second, and
pk (t) denotes the probability of transmitting k packets within the time period t. Ac-
cording to the conditions as above, in an arbitrarily short time ∆ t,the average number
of transmitted packets is λ∆ t. Dividing the finite time period t into n small time slices
∆ t, i.e., t = n∆ t, then the k packets transmitted in the time period t can be divided
into n parts. Let n→ ∞, then the probability of transmitting k packets in time period
t is
pk (t) =
e−λ t(λ t)k
k!
,k = 0,1,2, ... (1)
The Eq.1 states that, the probability pk (t) of transmitting k packets in time period
t obeys the Poisson distribution under the above three conditions [38]. According to
the basic properties of probability theory, it can be derived that:
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(1) The probability density function of the packet transmission interval is λe−λ t . In
other words, the packet transmission interval is subject to the exponential distri-
bution.
(2) The average number of transmitted packets during the time period t is E (k, t) =
∞
∑
k=0
kpk (t) = λ t. Therefore, the average number of transmitted packets per second
is E (k,1) = λ , and the average transmitted packets interval is 1/λ . Set the packet
size to κ , the average communication rate is R f = λκ .
(3) Let η denote a random number sequence of multiple packet transmission inter-
vals, which satisfies the exponential distribution with a mean of 1/λ . Therefore,
its cumulative distribution function is F (η) = 1− e−λη . Suppose ξ is a random
number sequence with uniformly distributed in [0,1], η can be produced as fol-
lows,
η =
1
λ
ln(1−ξ ) (2)
According to the analysis above, if the average number of transmitted packets
per second is λ , the packet transmission process can be simulated into an exponen-
tial distribution with the average transmission interval of 1/λ . Therefore, the traffic
generation module is constructed by the exponential distribution based packet trans-
mission interval.
3.2 Key generation module
A QKD system consists of the optical sub-system and the post-processing sub-system.
The key generation capability is determined by both performance of the two sub-
systems [39]. Therefore, it is not convincing to characterize the key generation capa-
bility only by the performance of the post-processing procedure as in the literature
[25].
In 2004, Gottesman et al. proposed the GLLP theory to calculate the secure key
generation rate of QKD system with imperfect devices [40]. This method has been
adopted in most practical QKD systems [9, 41–51]. Therefore, we use the GLLP
theory to model the key generation module. The formula to calculate the secure key
generation rate is as follows,
R = max
{−qQµ fecH (Eµ)+qQ1 [1−H (e1)] ,0} . (3)
In the Eq. 3, q is the sifting coefficient, the subscript µ denotes the intensity of signal
state, Qµ is the overall gain of signal state, Eµ is the overall quantum bit error rate
(QBER), Q1 is the gain of single-photon state, e1 is the error rate of single-photon
state, fec is the error correction efficiency, and H (x) is the binary Shannon informa-
tion function, given by H (x) =−xlog2 (x)− (1− x) log2 (1− x) .
Four key variables, Qµ , Eµ , Q1, e1, are required to calculate R. The first two can
be measured directly by experiment, however, the last two can only be estimated by
decoy state method. Let ηBob denote the transmittance of Bob, including the internal
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transmittance of optical components and detector efficiency. Note that Y0 is the back-
ground rate and e0 is the error rate of the background. Assuming that Alice and Bob
choose the vacuum + weak decoy state method, with expected photon numbers ν and
φ , which satisfy ν < µ and φ = 0. Thus Alice and Bob can estimate the background
rate,
Qφ = Y0, (4)
Eφ = e0. (5)
The overall gain and QBER of the signal state is given by
Qµ = 1− e−ηµ +Y0, (6)
QµEµ = e0Y0+ edet
(
1− e−ηµ) . (7)
The overall gain and QBER of the weak decoy state is given by
Qν = 1− e−ην +Y0, (8)
QνEν = e0Y0+ edet
(
1− e−ην) . (9)
Considering the statistical fluctuations of finite data-set size [52, 53] in real-life
experiments on the estimation process of Q1 and e1, the Chernoff bound [54] is used
to provide good bounds [55]. Let X1, X2, ... , Xn be a set of independent Bernoulli
random variables that satisfy P(Xi = 1) = pi, and let X =
n
∑
i=1
Xi and X = E (X). With
the security bound of ς = 2ε , we can draw the following inequalities [55],
P
(
X−X >
√
2X ln
(
ε−3/2
))≤ ε, (10)
P
(
X−X >
√
2X ln(16ε−4)
)
≤ ε. (11)
Denote the number of pluses sent by Alice for signal as Nµ , for weak as Nν and
for vacuum as Nφ . Let X denote the response count of signal state, then X = NµQµ .
According to Eq.10 and Eq.11, we can draw that
P
(
NµQµ −
√
2NµQµ ln
(
ε−3/2
)≤ NµQµ ≤ NµQµ +√2NµQµ ln(16ε−4))≥ 1−ς
Therefore, the lower bound and upper bound of Qµ is given by
QLµ = Qµ −
√
2Qµ ln
(
ε−3/2
)
Nµ
, (12)
QUµ = Qµ +
√
2Qµ ln(16ε−4)
Nµ
. (13)
And so on, for the QLν , Q
U
ν , Q
L
φ and Q
U
φ .
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Let X denote the error count of weak decoy state, then X = NνQνEν . According
to Eq.10 and Eq.11, the lower bound and upper bound of Eµ is given by
ELν = Eν −
√
2Eν ln
(
ε−3/2
)
NνQν
, (14)
EUν = Eν +
√
2Eν ln(16ε−4)
NνQν
. (15)
The ELφ and E
U
φ can be deduced by analogy.
Combining Eq.6 and Eq.8, the lower bound of Y1 is given by
Y1 ≥ Y L1 =
µ
µν−ν2
(
QLνe
ν − ν
2
µ2
QUµ e
µ − µ
2−ν2
µ2
Y0
)
. (16)
Under the condition of Eq.4 and Eq.5, the lower bound of Q1 and upper bound of e1
is given by
Q1 ≥ QL1 =
µ2e−µ
µν−ν2
(
QLνe
ν − ν
2
µ2
QUµ e
µ − µ
2−ν2
µ2
QUφ
)
, (17)
e1 ≤ eU1 =
µν−ν2
µν
QUν E
U
ν e
ν −QLφELφ
QLνeν − ν2µ2 Q
U
µ eµ − µ
2−ν2
µ2 Q
U
φ
. (18)
Substituting these parameter estimations into Eq.3, we can calculate the lower bound
of the secure key generation rate of one QKD device
R≥max{RL =−qQµ fecH (Eµ)+qQL1 [1−H (eU1 )] ,0} . (19)
Then, the key generation capability of a P2P link is given by
Rk = max
{
freqRL,0
}
, (20)
where freq is the repetition rate.
3.3 Performance indicators
To meet the requirement of ITS, it is necessary to utilize the OTP algorithm in the
QSCN for data encryption and decryption. The key generation capability of the net-
work is based on the P2P links, however the traffic demand is based on the E2E
partners. Under this condition, if the key generation capability cannot meet the traffic
demand, i.e. if the QSCN will paralyze at some point, directly affects the perfor-
mance of a QSCN. However, there is no counterpart in classical network, and there is
no appropriate indicator in classical network to measure such performance of QSCN
either. In this paper, two performance indicators are proposed: ITS communication
capability and ITS communication efficiency, as a necessary supplements to evaluate
a QSCN except for those traditional performance indicators of classical networks.
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3.3.1 ITS communication capability
For a given topology G = (V,E), let Rmk (m ∈ E) be the key generation capability of
the link m which is time-independent and can be calculated according to GLLP the-
ory. R f indicates the total traffic demand of all pairs of partners and R f ·Pi, j (i ∈V, j ∈V )
means the average traffic demand of node i and node j, which can be modeled by a
Poisson stochastic process and can be calculated according to the average packet
interval. ω i, j,m ∈ {0,1} indicates whether the communication of node i and node j
requires link m. In addition, Om represents the average number of keys consumed by
routing data on the link m.
To guarantee the stable operation of the network, the key consumption of each
link needs to be less than or equal to its key generation. The key consumption mainly
includes communication data consumption and routing data consumption. When the
OTP algorithm is used, the key consumption of communication data is equal to the
traffic.
∀m ∈ E, Rmk > ∑
i∈V
∑
j∈V
R f ·Pi, jω i, j,m+Om (21)
The ITS communication capability of the QSCN is defined as the maximum traf-
fic demand that enables all links to work stably. It is represented by a symbol C.
C = max
{
R f | ∀m ∈ E, ∑
i∈V
∑
j∈V
R f ·Pi, jω i, j,m+Om−Rmk 6 0
}
(22)
It can be seen from the formula that the ITS communication capability is mainly
related to the traffic demand, key generation capability and routing protocol.
3.3.2 ITS communication efficiency
When the traffic demand is higher than the ITS communication capability, the QSCN
will inevitably paralyze after running for a certain period of time. The time span
before the QSCN paralyzes is defined as ITS operation time, represented by the
symbol To. Let D be the initial number of keys on each link in the network and
R f ·Pi, j (t)(i ∈V, j ∈V ) be the traffic demand of node i and node j at the time of t. In
addition, ω i, j,m (t) ∈ {0,1} indicates whether the communication of node i and node
j requires link m at the time of t and Om (t) indicates the number of keys consumed
by routing data on the link m at the time of t. Then the network ITS operation time
must meet the following requirement:
To = max
T | ∀m ∈ E,
T∫
0
(
∑
i∈V
∑
j∈V
R f ·Pi, j (t)ω i, j,m (t)+Om (t)
)
dt−T ·Rmk 6 D
 (23)
When the network paralyzes, the number of remaining keys on the link m is:
Dm =
To∫
0
(
∑
i∈V
∑
j∈V
R f ·Pi, j (t)ω i, j,m (t)+Om (t)
)
dt−To ·Rmk (24)
10 Yaxing Wang et al.
The ITS recovery time is defined as the length of time required for the numbers
of keys on all links recover to D, represented by the symbol Tr.
Tr = min
{
T | ∀m ∈ E,T > D−Dm
Rmk
}
(25)
In order to ensure stable operation based on the OTP algorithm in any traffic
demand environment, the ITS operation time and ITS recovery time of the QSCN
must meet the preset requirement. The ratio of the ITS operation time to the sum of
ITS operation time and ITS recovery time is defined as ITS communication efficiency
Q as in the Eq. 26.
Q =
To
To+Tr
(26)
The ITS communication efficiency, which is mainly related to the traffic demand,
key generation capability and routing protocol, can be used to guide the actual work-
ing policy of the QSCN.
It can be seen from the formulas that when the network scale becomes large,
it is quite difficult to theoretically analyze the QSCN performance. In this case, the
network simulation becomes the most important, convenient and economical solution
for the performance analysis of the QSCN.
4 Simulation and results analysis
In this section, a QSCN simulation using Network Simulator-version 3 (NS-3) [28]
is designed to analyze the network performance.
4.1 Simulation design
The simulation design mainly includes the traffic generation, key generation, topol-
ogy and routing protocol, which can directly affect the performance of a QSCN.
4.1.1 Traffic generation
To simplify the analysis, the traffic demand between any two partners in our simula-
tion are assumed to be the same scale. Based on the analysis in Sec. 3.1, the packet
transmission intervals follow an exponential distribution. In order to find out the per-
formance bottleneck of QSCN , two comparison simulations are conducted with com-
munication rates of 100 Kbps and 10 Kbps. In the case where the packet size is set
to 500 bytes, the average packet transmission intervals are set to 40 milliseconds and
400 milliseconds.
In a practical network, a classical link often needs to serve multiple partners,
which will lead to two kinds of problems. Firstly, when the traffic demand of a pair
of terminal partners is met, it may reduce the communication performance of another
pair of terminal parties. Secondly, the change of paths for a certain pair of terminal
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partners may improve the communication performance of others. Therefore, it is not
reasonable to only analyze the traffic demand of one pair of terminal partners as in
the literature [25]. Therefore, we should consider the traffic demand of all pairs of
partners at the same time, as shown in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 End-to-end traffic generation of whole network
Input: a given topology G = (V,E) with the node size of n and the edge size of m, traffic generation
module with the average packet interval of 1/λ , packet size of κ , routing protocol of ω , total duration
of simulation T
Output: The key consumptions of all links comCnt (an array of size m)
1: comCnt← 0
2: while t < T do
3: for each vertex vi,v j(16 i6 n,16 j 6 n, i 6= j) ∈ G,V do
4: for each edge ek(16 k 6 m) ∈ G,E do
5: comCnt (k)← comCnt (k)+ω i, j,m (t) ·κ . Calculate the key consumption of the link ek
6: ξ = Rnd (0,1) . Let ξ as a random number in the [0,1]
7: η = 1λ ln(1−ξ ) . Calculate the packet interval
8: t← t+η . Send next packet after the packet interval
9: end for
10: end for
11: end while
4.1.2 Key generation
To simplify the analysis, we assume that only one QKD device is configured on each
link and the parameters of all QKD devices are the same. The parameters of QKD
device in our simulation are shown in Table 1, referring to the literature [11]. It should
be noted that the QSCN model supports the configuration of multiple QKD devices
for each link and the different parameter setting for each QKD device.
Table 1 Parameters of QKD devices
freq q α ηBob edet µ ν φ Y0 e0 fec Nµ Nν Nφ ς
1 GHz 0.9 0.2 db/km 0.1 0.01 0.4 0.1 0 2.1E-5 0.5 1.15 1.6E10 2E9 2E9 5.73E-7
According to the parameters as Table 1, the key generation rate of each link can
be calculated. In order to find out the performance bottleneck of the whole network,
we make all QKD devices with different distribution distances start generating keys
at the same time, and simulate the process of key generation, as shown in Algorithm
2.
4.1.3 Topology
To the best of our knowledge, the most comprehensive study on QSCN performance
appears in the literature [25]. For comparison, the topology of SECOQC network [30]
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Algorithm 2 Point-to-point key generation of whole network
Input: a given topology G= (V,E) with the node size of n and the edge size of m, key generation module
with
(
frep,q,Qµ ,Eµ , fc,Q1,e1
)
, total duration of simulation T
Output: The key generations of all links genCnt (an array of size m)
1: genCnt← 0
2: for each link ek(16 k 6 m) ∈ G,E do
3: Rk ←max
{− freqqQµ fecH (Eµ)+ freqqQL1 [1−H (eU1 )] ,0} . Calculate the key generation rate
4: genCnt (k)← genCnt (k)+Rk ·T
5: end for
used in [25], as shown in Fig. 3. Besides, the trusted relays adopted in our simulation
work on the basis of the hop-by-hop [30]. Each node in the topology is a communica-
tion user and acts as a trusted relay. In another word, each node should be configured
with the classical communication equipment, the QKD device, encryption/decryption
module, key management module, traffic monitoring module.
Fig. 3 Topology of the QSCN
4.1.4 Routing protocol
The traffic demand that the network needs to meet is E2E based, however, the key
consumption is P2P based. Through the design of better routing protocol, it is ex-
pected to maximize the utilization of the P2P key generation capability to satisfy the
E2E traffic demand, thereby improving network performance. Due to the frequent
changes of the number of keys during the simulation process, the connected/broken
state of a link may change as well, which leads to frequent changes of the network
topology. It means that the selected routing protocol should be able to perceive the
network topology changes in time. Therefore, the DSDV routing protocol [56], which
is commonly used in the wireless ad hoc network, is adopted. The DSDV protocol
updates routing table regularly.
4.2 Performance of traditional indicators
In this section, four most important performance indicators of classical network are
evaluate to analyze the QSCN performance, which are: one-way delay (OWD) [57],
throughput [58], packet delivery rate (PDR) [25] and routing cost (RCost) [59]. OWD
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is the required time of data packet transmission across the network, which may be
affected by any component of the related links. Throughput is defined as the rate of
successful message delivery over a communication channel. PDR refers to the ratio
of the received packets by the destination to the generated packets by the source.
RCost refers to the amount of routing data generated during network operation.
Based on the QSCN model and the foregoing parameters, the simulation results of
OWD (v1→ v6), throughput (v1→ v6), PDR (v1→ v6), and RCost of whole network
with the average packet interval of 400 millisecond (communication rates of 10 Kbps)
and 40 millisecond (100 Kbps) are shown in Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 respectively.
Fig. 4 Network performance with 10 Kbps communication rate
Fig. 5 Network performance with 100 Kbps communication rate
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From Fig. 4 and Fig. 5, it can be seen that there is almost no difference in OWD,
throughput, and PDR between the two communication rates before the 47th second.
However, after the 47th second, the performance in Fig. 4 remains stable. Conversely,
the sharp rise of OWD, sharp drop of throughput and PDR in Fig. 5 indicates that the
node v6 cannot accept any packet from the node v1. In other words, the network is
paralyzed at the 47th second.
4.3 Performance of proposed indicators
4.3.1 ITS communication capability
The simulation results of traditional evaluation indicators show that when the traffic
demand exceeds a certain value, the network will paralyze after a certain period of
continuous operation. To find out the maximum traffic demand that the QSCN can
support stably is very important for the QSCN designer and manager. Therefore, ITS
communication capability is proposed and simulated.
In order to explore the reasons for paralysis, the key consumption at the commu-
nication rate of 100 Kbps is simulated, as shown in Fig. 6(a). Each curve in the figure
reflects the key consumption process of a link. Meanwhile, the slope of the curve
represents the consumption rate. The initial number of keys of each key pool is set
to be 40 Mb. The partners need a small number of pre-shared keys before a new key
generation process is established [60, 61]. The pre-shared keys are used to guarantee
the integrity of the protocol in the first transaction and it should not be used for any
other purposes except to establish a new key generation process. In our simulation,
the minimal threshold is set to 2 Mb. From the Fig. 6(a), it can be concluded that
the link with the fastest key consumption rate is e1. At the 47th second, because the
remaining number of keys is below the minimum threshold, this link is “broken”.
(a) 100 Kbps communication rate (b) 23 Kbps communication rate
Fig. 6 Key consumption in the SECOQC topology
DSDV routing protocol finds the optimal path based on the principle of minimum
hop count. Therefore, the key generation of link e1 needs to satisfy the communica-
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tion traffic demand of five pairs of communication partners (v1,v2), (v1,v3), (v1,v4),
(v1,v5) and (v1,v6). Considering that the communication process is bidirectional, the
link e1 will load 5 * 2 = 10 times of the one-way traffic demand of one pair of com-
munication partners. According to the topology in Fig. 3, the length of link e1 is 85
km. By substituting the length into the GLLP theory, the calculated key generation
rate is about 233 Kbps. From Fig. 5, the consumption rate of DSDV protocol routing
data of whole network is about 4 Kbps. There are 8 links in the network, we can de-
duce that the routing data consumption of link e1 is about 4/8≈ 0.5 Kbps. Therefore,
in order to implement ITS transmission in the QSCN directly, the traffic demand that
link e1 can afford is only about (233 - 0.5)/(5*2)≈ 23 Kbps.
Fig. 6(b) shows the key consumption when the communication rate is 23 Kbps. It
can be seen that the number of keys of link e1 maintains the original amount basically.
The results demonstrate that the key consumption and key generation on the link e1
are balanced, which is consistent with the theoretical analysis as above.
4.3.2 ITS Communication Efficiency
ITS communication capability can indicate the maximal traffic demand that the QSCN
is able to support stably. However, when the traffic demand exceeds the ITS commu-
nication capability, the QSCN must need a certain recovery time after it operate for
some time to maintain a stable communication. The less proportion of recovery time
means higher performance. Therefore, the ITS communication efficiency is proposed
and simulated, which is the ratio of the ITS operation time to the sum of ITS operation
time and ITS recovery time.
The simulation results previously show that, due to the insufficient key generation
capability of the QSCN, the communication process can only last 47 seconds at the
communication rate of 100 Kbps. It needs to make clear that the 47 seconds is the
network ITS operation time at the communication rate of 100 Kbps.
To ≈ 47 seconds (27)
The simulation results previously show that the first paralyzed link is the link e1.
It can be seen from the topology that the key generation rate of the link e1. Therefore,
in this simulation, the ITS recovery time of the network depends on the ITS recovery
time of the link e1, which can be calculated as Eq.28.
Tr =
40 Mb−2Mb
233 Kbps
≈ 163 seconds (28)
According to the Eq.26, the ITS communication efficiency can be calculated as
Eq.29.
Q =
To
To+Tr
=
47 seconds
47 seconds+163 seconds
≈ 22% (29)
From the analysis above, the ITS communication capability and ITS communica-
tion efficiency of this QSCN is 23 Kbps and 22% respectively. Therefore, the QSCN
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can work stable when the traffic demand is lower than 23 Kbps, such as short mes-
sage, audio communication, etc. In addition, when the traffic demand is higher than
the ITS communication capability, such as real-time video communication, suitable
key management mechanism or QKD network improvement need to be designed ac-
cordingly.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, a practical QSCN model is proposed and the three major improvements
include: (I) the volatility of traffic demand of classical network is modeled by the
Poisson stochastic process; (II) the capability of key generation in QKD network is
calculated by the GLLP theory; (III) two performance indicators are proposed, which
are ITS communication capability and ITS communication efficiency. In addition, the
simulation is designed based on the QSCN model with the topology of the SECOQC
network and the DSDV routing protocol. The plentiful simulation results verified the
accuracy of the proposed QSCN model, and the necessity of the proposed perfor-
mance indicators. In the further, we plain to design better QKD device deployment
and routing protocols to improve the ITS communication capability and the ITS com-
munication efficiency.
Acknowledgements This work is supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant
Number: 61771168, 61702224), Space Science and Technology Advance Research Joint Funds (6141B061
10105).
References
1. Bennett, C.H., Brassard, G.: Quantum cryptography: public key distribution and
coin tossing. Theor. Comput. Sci. 560(12), 7–11 (2014)
2. Chen, X.B., Tang, X., Xu, G., Dou, Z., Chen, Y.L., Yang, Y.X.: Cryptanalysis
of secret sharing with a single d-level quantum system. Quantum Information
Processing 17(9), 225 (2018)
3. Xu, G., Chen, X.B., Dou, Z., Yang, Y.X., Li, Z.: A novel protocol for multiparty
quantum key management. Quantum Information Processing 14(8), 2959–2980
(2015)
4. Chen, X.B., Sun, Y.R., Xu, G., Jia, H.Y., Qu, Z., Yang, Y.X.: Controlled bidirec-
tional remote preparation of three-qubit state. Quantum Information Processing
16(10), 244 (2017)
5. Elliott, C., Colvin, A., Pearson, D., Pikalo, O., Schlafer, J., Yeh, H.: Current
status of the darpa quantum network. In: Quantum Information and computation
III, vol. 5815, pp. 138–150. International Society for Optics and Photonics (2005)
6. Elliott, C., Yeh, H.: Darpa quantum network testbed. Tech. rep., BBN TECH-
NOLOGIES CAMBRIDGE MA (2007)
7. Alleaume, R., Roueff, F., Diamanti, E., Lu¨tkenhaus, N.: Topological optimization
of quantum key distribution networks. New Journal of Physics 11(7), 075002
(2009)
Modeling and Simulation of Practical Quantum Secure Communication Network 17
8. Dianati, M., Alle´aume, R.: Architecture of the secoqc quantum key distribution
network. In: Quantum, Nano, and Micro Technologies, 2007. ICQNM’07. First
International Conference on, pp. 13–13. IEEE (2007)
9. Sasaki, M., Fujiwara, M., Ishizuka, H., Klaus, W., Wakui, K., Takeoka, M., Miki,
S., Yamashita, T., Wang, Z., Tanaka, A., et al.: Field test of quantum key distri-
bution in the tokyo qkd network. Optics express 19(11), 10387–10409 (2011)
10. Chen, L.K., Yong, H.L., Xu, P., Yao, X.C., Xiang, T., Li, Z.D., Liu, C., Lu, H.,
Liu, N.L., Li, L., et al.: Experimental nested purification for a linear optical quan-
tum repeater. Nature Photonics 11(11), 695 (2017)
11. Yuan, Z., Plews, A., Takahashi, R., Doi, K., Tam, W., Sharpe, A., Dixon, A.,
Lavelle, E., Dynes, J., Murakami, A., et al.: 10-mb/s quantum key distribution.
Journal of Lightwave Technology 36(16), 3427–3433 (2018)
12. Dixon, A.R., Yuan, Z., Dynes, J., Sharpe, A., Shields, A.: Continuous operation
of high bit rate quantum key distribution. Applied Physics Letters 96(16), 161102
(2010)
13. Yin, H.L., Chen, T.Y., Yu, Z.W., Liu, H., You, L.X., Zhou, Y.H., Chen, S.J., Mao,
Y., Huang, M.Q., Zhang, W.J., et al.: Measurement-device-independent quantum
key distribution over a 404 km optical fiber. Physical review letters 117(19),
190501 (2016)
14. Liao, S.K., Cai, W.Q., Liu, W.Y., Zhang, L., Li, Y., Ren, J.G., Yin, J., Shen, Q.,
Cao, Y., Li, Z.P., et al.: Satellite-to-ground quantum key distribution. Nature
549(7670), 43 (2017)
15. Peev, M., Pacher, C., Alle´aume, R., Barreiro, C., Bouda, J., Boxleitner, W., De-
buisschert, T., Diamanti, E., Dianati, M., Dynes, J., et al.: The secoqc quantum
key distribution network in vienna. New Journal of Physics 11(7), 075001 (2009)
16. Razavi, M.: An Introduction to Quantum Communications Networks. 2053-
2571. Morgan & Claypool Publishers (2018). DOI 10.1088/978-1-6817-4653-1.
URL http://dx.doi.org/10.1088/978-1-6817-4653-1
17. Watanabe, S., Matsumoto, R., Uyematsu, T.: Security of quantum key distribu-
tion protocol with two-way classical communication assisted by one-time pad
encryption. arXiv preprint quant-ph/0608030 (2006)
18. Dianati, M., Alle´aume, R., Gagnaire, M., Shen, X.: Architecture and protocols
of the future european quantum key distribution network. Security and Commu-
nication Networks 1(1), 57–74 (2008)
19. Diamanti, E., Lo, H.K., Qi, B., Yuan, Z.: Practical challenges in quantum key
distribution. npj Quantum Information 2, 16025 (2016)
20. Li, J., Chen, X.B., Xu, G., Yang, Y.X., Li, Z.P.: Perfect quantum network coding
independent of classical network solutions. IEEE Communications Letters 19(2),
115–118 (2015)
21. Li, J., Chen, X., Sun, X., Li, Z., Yang, Y.: Quantum network coding for multi-
unicast problem based on 2d and 3d cluster states. Science China Information
Sciences 59(4), 042301 (2016)
22. Xu, G., Chen, X.B., Li, J., Wang, C., Yang, Y.X., Li, Z.: Network coding for
quantum cooperative multicast. Quantum Information Processing 14(11), 4297–
4322 (2015)
18 Yaxing Wang et al.
23. Maurhart, O., Pacher, C., Happe, A., Lor, T., Tamas, C., Poppe, A., Peev, M.:
New release of an open source qkd software: design and implementation of new
algorithms, modularization and integration with ipsec. In: Proc. Qcrypt. Citeseer
(2013)
24. Yang, C., Zhang, H., Su, J.: The qkd network: model and routing scheme. Journal
of Modern Optics 64(21), 2350–2362 (2017)
25. Mehic, M., Maurhart, O., Rass, S., Voznak, M.: Implementation of quantum key
distribution network simulation module in the network simulator ns-3. Quantum
Information Processing 16(10), 253 (2017)
26. Salvail, L., Peev, M., Diamanti, E., Alle´aume, R., Lu¨tkenhaus, N., La¨nger, T.:
Security of trusted repeater quantum key distribution networks. Journal of Com-
puter Security 18(1), 61–87 (2010)
27. Scarani, V., Bechmann-Pasquinucci, H., Cerf, N.J., Dusˇek, M., Lu¨tkenhaus, N.,
Peev, M.: The security of practical quantum key distribution. Reviews of modern
physics 81(3), 1301 (2009)
28. Henderson, T.R., Lacage, M., Riley, G.F., Dowell, C., Kopena, J.: Network sim-
ulations with the ns-3 simulator. SIGCOMM demonstration 14(14), 527 (2008)
29. Gelfond, R., Berzanskis, A.: Key management and user authentication for quan-
tum cryptography networks (2012). US Patent 8,340,298
30. Poppe, A., Peev, M., Maurhart, O.: Outline of the secoqc quantum-key-
distribution network in vienna. International Journal of Quantum Information
6(02), 209–218 (2008)
31. Mehic, M., Maurhart, O., Rass, S., Komosny, D., Rezac, F., Voznak, M.: Analysis
of the public channel of quantum key distribution link. IEEE Journal of Quantum
Electronics 53(5), 1–8 (2017)
32. McHale, J.F.: Communication server apparatus and method (1997). US Patent
5,668,857
33. Weigle, M.C., Adurthi, P., Herna´ndez-Campos, F., Jeffay, K., Smith, F.D.: Tmix:
a tool for generating realistic tcp application workloads in ns-2. ACM SIG-
COMM Computer Communication Review 36(3), 65–76 (2006)
34. Varet, A., Larrieu, N.: How to generate realistic network traffic? In: 2014 IEEE
38th Annual Computer Software and Applications Conference, pp. 299–304.
IEEE (2014)
35. Bonelli, N., Giordano, S., Procissi, G., Secchi, R.: Brute: A high performance
and extensible traffic generator. In: Proc. of SPECTS, pp. 839–845 (2005)
36. Ammar, D., Begin, T., Guerin-Lassous, I.: A new tool for generating realistic
internet traffic in ns-3. In: Proceedings of the 4th International ICST Conference
on Simulation Tools and Techniques, pp. 81–83 (2011)
37. Botta, A., Dainotti, A., Pescape´, A.: A tool for the generation of realistic net-
work workload for emerging networking scenarios. Computer Networks 56(15),
3531–3547 (2012)
38. Gardiner, C.: Stochastic methods, vol. 4. springer Berlin (2009)
39. Tamaki, K., Lo, H.K., Wang, W., Lucamarini, M.: Information theoretic secu-
rity of quantum key distribution overcoming the repeaterless secret key capacity
bound. arXiv preprint arXiv:1805.05511 (2018)
Modeling and Simulation of Practical Quantum Secure Communication Network 19
40. Gottesman, D., Lo, H.K., Lutkenhaus, N., Preskill, J.: Security of quantum key
distribution with imperfect devices. In: Information Theory, 2004. ISIT 2004.
Proceedings. International Symposium on, p. 136. IEEE (2004)
41. Tang, Z., Wei, K., Bedroya, O., Qian, L., Lo, H.K.: Experimental measurement-
device-independent quantum key distribution with imperfect sources. Physical
Review A 93(4), 042308 (2016)
42. Zhou, Y.H., Yu, Z.W., Wang, X.B.: Making the decoy-state measurement-device-
independent quantum key distribution practically useful. Physical Review A
93(4), 042324 (2016)
43. Tang, Y.L., Yin, H.L., Zhao, Q., Liu, H., Sun, X.X., Huang, M.Q., Zhang, W.J.,
Chen, S.J., Zhang, L., You, L.X., et al.: Measurement-device-independent quan-
tum key distribution over untrustful metropolitan network. Physical Review X
6(1), 011024 (2016)
44. Lucamarini, M., Yuan, Z.L., Dynes, J.F., Shields, A.J.: Overcoming the rate–
distance limit of quantum key distribution without quantum repeaters. Nature
557(7705), 400 (2018)
45. Rosenberg, D., Harrington, J.W., Rice, P.R., Hiskett, P.A., Peterson, C.G.,
Hughes, R.J., Lita, A.E., Nam, S.W., Nordholt, J.E.: Long-distance decoy-state
quantum key distribution in optical fiber. Physical review letters 98(1), 010503
(2007)
46. Zhao, Y., Qi, B., Ma, X., Lo, H.K., Qian, L.: Experimental quantum key distri-
bution with decoy states. Physical review letters 96(7), 070502 (2006)
47. Gisin, N., Fasel, S., Kraus, B., Zbinden, H., Ribordy, G.: Trojan-horse attacks on
quantum-key-distribution systems. Physical Review A 73(2), 022320 (2006)
48. Lo, H.K., Curty, M., Qi, B.: Measurement-device-independent quantum key dis-
tribution. Physical review letters 108(13), 130503 (2012)
49. Schmitt-Manderbach, T., Weier, H., Fu¨rst, M., Ursin, R., Tiefenbacher, F.,
Scheidl, T., Perdigues, J., Sodnik, Z., Kurtsiefer, C., Rarity, J.G., et al.: Exper-
imental demonstration of free-space decoy-state quantum key distribution over
144 km. Physical Review Letters 98(1), 010504 (2007)
50. Deng, F.G., Long, G.L.: Secure direct communication with a quantum one-time
pad. Physical Review A 69(5), 052319 (2004)
51. Braunstein, S.L., Pirandola, S.: Side-channel-free quantum key distribution.
Physical review letters 108(13), 130502 (2012)
52. Ma, X., Qi, B., Zhao, Y., Lo, H.K.: Practical decoy state for quantum key distri-
bution. Physical Review A 72(1), 012326 (2005)
53. Ma, X., Fung, C.H.F., Razavi, M.: Statistical fluctuation analysis for
measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution. Physical Review A
86(5), 052305 (2012)
54. Curty, M., Xu, F., Cui, W., Lim, C.C.W., Tamaki, K., Lo, H.K.: Finite-key analy-
sis for measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution. Nature com-
munications 5, 3732 (2014)
55. Yin, H.L., Cao, W.F., Fu, Y., Tang, Y.L., Liu, Y., Chen, T.Y., Chen, Z.B.:
Long-distance measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution with
coherent-state superpositions. Optics letters 39(18), 5451–5454 (2014)
20 Yaxing Wang et al.
56. Perkins, C.E., Bhagwat, P.: Highly dynamic destination-sequenced distance-
vector routing (dsdv) for mobile computers. In: ACM SIGCOMM computer
communication review, vol. 24, pp. 234–244. ACM (1994)
57. Almes, G., Kalidindi, S., Zekauskas, M., Morton, A.: A one-way delay metric
for ip performance metrics (ippm). Tech. rep. (2016)
58. Burgess, N.: Rfc 2544 testing of ethernet services in telecom networks. White
paper (2004)
59. Evans, S.C., Pearlman, M.R., Hartman, M.J., Rothe, A., Leiva, M.A., Egan,
M.W.: Routing cost based network congestion control for quality of service
(2009). US Patent 7,489,635
60. Dodson, D., Fujiwara, M., Grangier, P., Hayashi, M., Imafuku, K., Kitayama,
K.i., Kumar, P., Kurtsiefer, C., Lenhart, G., Luetkenhaus, N., et al.: Updating
quantum cryptography report ver. 1. arXiv preprint arXiv:0905.4325 (2009)
61. Cederlof, J., Larsson, J.A˚.: Security aspects of the authentication used in quan-
tum cryptography. IEEE transactions on Information Theory 54(4), 1735–1741
(2008)
